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Abstract 
Much research on Brexit has studied whether the vote to leave the EU is a marker of growing 
prejudice. In this paper, we study instead how the relationship between support for Brexit and 
prejudice is constructed, negotiated and contested in lay discourse. Our analysis of focus 
groups (N=12) conducted prior to and following the EU referendum shows that support for 
Brexit was predominantly constructed as based on nationalism and anti-immigration 
prejudice, especially in Remain-supporting accounts. This prompted identity management 
strategies and counter-arguments by Leave supporters, such as providing alternative 
constructions of prejudice and racism; relating Brexit with ‘progressive’ values; and 
presenting it as rational and economically sound. In our discussion, we draw attention to the 
‘ideological creativity’ that underpins these accounts and also reflect on the possibilities and 
constraints of developing alternative political narratives under conditions of political 
polarisation. 
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Lay discourses about Brexit and prejudice: ‘ideological creativity’ and its limits in 
Brexit debates 
  
This paper studies the construction of prejudice in lay political debates, taking the case of 
Brexit as its empirical focus. 2016 was arguably a year of political turbulence for Western 
liberal democracies. This was encapsulated in two unanticipated electoral results: the election 
of Trump as US President and the Brexit vote in the UK to leave the European Union. These 
events have been described as representing a rupture of ‘politics as usual’. Here, we focus on 
Brexit, but much of our analysis can be related to other contexts where the ‘liberal order’ is 
seen as being challenged by new political movements. 
 
In the 2016 referendum on EU membership, 52% of those who cast their votes voted for 
Leave against 48% for Remain. Following this largely unexpected result (which contravened 
the official lines of both major political parties), much has been written about the reasons 
behind the Leave vote. On the one hand, analysis has focused on the extent to which Brexit 
support can be explained by social inequalities and the disenfranchisement of the so-called 
‘left-behind’ voters. Research has shown that citizens who can be seen as being left behind in 
the global economy voted for Brexit (Goodwin & Heath, 2016). In that regard, Brexit can be 
understood as the result of a longstanding failure of the political class to represent working 
class communities (Koch, 2017; Mckenzie, 2017). Supporters of Brexit have argued that the 
vote for Leave was a protest vote and that it should be heralded as a victory of ‘the people’ 
against ‘the establishment’.  
 
On the other hand, support for Brexit has also been constructed as rooted in xenophobia and 
racism (e.g. Khalili, 2017). The murder of Remain campaigner and Member of Parliament, Jo 
Cox, by a white supremacist; the stoking of anti-immigration sentiments in some Leave 
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campaigning; as well as the association of Brexit support with the UK far-right (particularly 
the UK Independence Party, UKIP), have facilitated the linkage between support for Brexit 
and prejudice, especially among supporters of Remain.  
  
The question of whether Brexit, as well as other political changes of the past few years (such 
as the election of Trump and the growth of right-wing populism across Europe), mark a shift 
to more illiberal politics has been addressed by psychologists. This is not surprising given 
that prejudice, which is rooted in the main assumptions and dilemmas of liberal ideology, is a 
core social psychological concept. In the context of Brexit, the research focus has been on 
measuring the extent to which individual support for Brexit is associated with well-
established psychological variables. Support for Brexit has been shown to be associated with 
prejudice in various ways: for instance, it has been found to be related to anti-immigration 
attitudes (Meleady, Seger & Vermue, 2017), nationalistic attitudes, authoritarianism and 
cognitive inflexibility (Zmigrod, Rentfrow & Robbins, 2018), and Islamophobia (Swami, 
Barron, Weis & Furnham, 2018).  
 
Contrary to existing literature, instead of seeking to establish whether support for Brexit is 
indeed the result of prejudice, this paper argues that constructions of prejudice are complex 
symbolic resources which help people position themselves and others within the changing 
political landscape of Brexit Britain. For example, as we will show, by constructing Brexit 
supporters as xenophobic and Remain supporters as tolerant, Brexit can be understood as a 
nationalistic project that should be resisted. On the other hand, casting Remainers as elites 
who are themselves prejudiced against the ‘ordinary people’ who voted Brexit, constructs 
Brexit as a democratic project that serves the will of the majority. The way that the 
   4  
relationship between Brexit and prejudice is constructed has therefore clear political 
implications and it is related to different visions for Britain in the Brexit era. 
 
This paper explores how the relationship between support for Brexit and prejudice is 
discursively constructed in lay talk; how these constructions are grounded in a complex web 
of ideological traditions; and how they are negotiated and managed in the context of focus 
group discussions about the EU referendum. To do this, we draw mainly on critical 
discursive psychology. This approach is particularly useful as it enables us to examine 
prejudice as a social construction and a social practice, rather than a predefined entity; that is, 
as a concern of lay people in their encounters, instead of an exclusive interest of social and 
political scientists. This approach brings together macro and micro analytical perspectives 
(see Wetherell, 1998) by providing us with tools to explore what identity stakes are raised in 
this political context, how these stakes are bound to systems of ideology, and how they are 
manifested and managed in focus group micro-interactions. More specifically, a critical 
discursive psychological approach allows us to explore the ways in which lay people 
implicate historically specific assumptions on the nature of prejudice in their everyday 
interactions with others, while being oriented to advance their political arguments and to 
manage their moral accountability in specific rhetorical settings.  
 
Prejudice as a social practice 
As stated above, our focus is how the relationship between support for Brexit and prejudice is 
constructed, managed and contested in lay discourse. Existing psychology literature on 
prejudice operates on the basis of analysts’ definitions of prejudice, and related concepts such 
as racism, and thus implicitly treats it as a settled matter. The focus of traditional prejudice 
research is also on how people may be individually prejudiced, for example, due to their 
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personalities or ‘faulty’ cognitive assessments (see Dixon, 2017, for a critical assessment of 
the field). In contrast, critically oriented social psychologists study the ways in which race 
and racism are socially constructed and contested as collaborative accomplishments (Condor 
et al., 2006) – i.e., the various ways in which ‘race’ and ‘racism’ are produced in interactions. 
Durrheim and colleagues’ notion of ‘race trouble’ is useful in this regard (Durrheim, Mtose, 
& Brown, 2011; Durrheim, Greener & Whitehead, 2015). These authors argue that 
identifying and naming race and racism are hearable as racist, so speakers refer to them 
indirectly in their talk (see also ‘norm against prejudice’ in next section). The concept of race 
trouble highlights these ideological and rhetorical difficulties in race talk. It draws attention 
to the intricate ways that constructions of race and racism structure talk and interactions 
about issues related to race and how they organise and institutionalise racialised social 
relations, e.g. through concrete policies and practices (Durrheim, Greener & Whitehead, 
2015). The study of race trouble therefore focuses on the interaction within which racism is 
constructed rather than on identifying racist discourses or attitudes. The current study adopts 
this line of thinking and directly examines contestations with respect to the nature of 
prejudice, rather than providing or assuming a definition. We see definitions of prejudice as 
produced, negotiated and contested through meaning-making social practices (see Andreouli, 
Greenland & Howarth, 2016).  
 
This social constructionist approach has been particularly developed within the framework of 
discursive psychology (Augoustinos, 2016), which emphasises the role of language and 
discourse in constructing knowledge about the social world, for example, the categories we 
use to make sense of the world, such as ‘us’ and ‘them’, ‘nationals’ and ‘foreigners’ etc. (see 
Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Discursively constructed knowledge about the world (including 
knowledge about which acts are deemed to be prejudiced or not) constitutes a symbolic 
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resource that social actors draw upon and mobilise as they navigate their social world and 
interact with others. In this sense, prejudice is not something that people ‘have’, but 
something they ‘do’. It is a social practice (Durrheim, Quayle & Dixon, 2016) which is 
achieved in the course of social relationships. This has been empirically studied, among 
others, by Condor and colleagues (e.g. 2006; Condor & Figgou, 2012), who have shown how 
the meanings of prejudice are actively and collectively argued about in focus group 
discussions, through prejudice claims (i.e. labelling an act or a person as prejudiced) and 
denials (i.e. denying the accusation that an act or a person is prejudiced). In one of the earlier 
works in this area, Wetherell and Potter (1992) studied white New Zealanders’ lay accounts 
of the history of exclusion of the Maori minority, with one of their key findings being how 
seemingly egalitarian arguments can be used to perpetuate racism (see also Augoustinos & 
Every, 2007).  
 
Wetherell and Potter’s (1992) pioneering work showed that lay discourses about prejudice 
and race are politically consequential. As Durrheim, Quayle and Dixon (2016) put it, “the 
struggle for the nature of prejudice determines who can be badly treated and by whom” (p. 
17). Definitions of prejudice are employed to advance specific political projects. For instance, 
Durrheim, Quayle and Dixon (2016) explain that constructions of prejudice can be used to 
mobilise hate against ‘Others’ who are deemed prejudiced. This was the case, for example, in 
President Bush’s call-to-arms discourse following 9/11 which was used to justify the 
invasions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Another example comes from Greenland, Andreouli, 
Augoustinos and Taulke-Johnson (2018) who argue that discursively narrowing the 
boundaries of discrimination in everyday talk (for example, by constructing ‘discrimination-
proper’ as intentional and aggressive behaviour towards minority group members) ultimately 
serves to render discrimination a rare and exceptional experience, thus limiting political 
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incentives for reducing it. We discuss the ideological dimensions of the prejudice concept in 
more detail in the next section. 
 
Prejudice and ideology 
Billig, Condor, Edwards, Gane, Middleton and Radley (1988) have shown that the concept of 
prejudice is rooted in the ideology of liberalism which originates in 18th century 
Enlightenment, particularly the valorisation of reason against bias and irrational thinking. In 
this early formulation, prejudice referred to irrationality in the sense of making judgements 
without prior rational assessment. This meaning gradually acquired a more specific focus on 
intergroup relations, i.e. negative attitudes towards others on the basis of racial and ethnic 
categorisations (Billig et al., 1988; Billig, 2012). Because of this ideological tradition, 
prejudice in today’s liberal democracies is strongly frowned upon. There is a widespread 
cultural norm against prejudice which requires that people are not prejudiced towards 
members of other groups, but that they think and behave in a rational and tolerant manner. 
 
To unpack this relationship between prejudice and irrationality in common-sense, Figgou and 
Condor (2006) studied the ways that interviewees in Greece understood and used the 
constructs of ‘prejudice’ and ‘racism’ in discussions about the settlement of Albanian 
refugees in Greece. In their analysis, Figgou and Condor identified four repertoires through 
which an action or event could be framed as a matter of prejudice or racism. Prejudice or 
racism could refer to: an unjustifiable and irrational belief in the existence of categorical 
differences between groups; intolerance of intergroup difference; attributing such difference 
to nature instead of social factors; and negative feelings towards low-status group members 
by high-status group members. When interviewees, however, discussed specific hostile acts 
against 
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treated as matters of security. Participants constructed themselves as responding to a 
perceived risk of migrant criminality, rather than being prejudiced (which would need to be 
accounted for in line with the norm against prejudice).  
 
Most work on the norm against prejudice has focused specifically on talk concerning race 
and immigration. In her early work in the field, Condor (2000) has showed that, in an 
interview setting, English participants treated talk about ‘this country’ as potentially 
xenophobic. Thus, they avoided making explicit mention of ‘this country’ and adopting an 
overt national footing or displaying a sense of national pride. These rhetorical strategies 
allowed participants to manage their self-presentations in order to appear non-prejudiced. 
Similar research on how moral accountability is managed in prejudice-related talk has been 
conducted using more naturalistic methods. Barnes, Palmary and Durrheim (2001), analysed 
natural conversations in South Africa and found that using humour, personal experience, and 
self-censorship were all strategies that allowed speakers to distance themselves from racist 
views and to inoculate themselves from accusations of racism when saying something that 
could be heard as racist. Whitehead (2018), in his analysis of radio broadcasts in the same 
national context, has also shown how the (in)accuracy of possible stereotypes can be 
employed as a resource for arguing for/against their moral acceptability. Research on such 
rhetorical strategies employed in talk that is potentially hearable as prejudiced (e.g. against 
asylum seekers, Roma, ethnic minorities) has also been conducted in online settings (e.g. 
Facebook discussions, Burke & Goodman, 2012; comments in online articles, Faulkner & 
Bliuc, 2016; Goodman & Rowe, 2013; online discussion forums, Durrheim, Greener & 
Whitehead, 2015). 
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In their review of the field, Augoustinos and Every (2007) have outlined five strategies for 
disclaiming a prejudiced identity in contemporary race talk: denying prejudice through the 
use of disclaimers (e.g. “I’m not racist but”); presenting one’s views as reasonable and 
rational (e.g., that limits to immigration are common-sense; Capdevila & Callaghan, 2008); 
presenting oneself positively and others negatively (e.g. refugees as ‘benefit scroungers’); 
discursively deracialising arguments (e.g., that opposition to asylum seekers is based on 
economic concerns or on a migrant’s’ specific psychological characteristics, rather than their 
group memberships; Goodman & Burke, 2011; Sapountzis & Vikka, 2015); and employing 
liberal arguments (e.g. equality-based) to argue against minority groups.  
 
Discursive strategies of prejudice denial are intimately entangled with social constructions of 
what constitutes ‘real’ prejudice (Greenland, Andreouli, Augoustinos & Taulke-Johnson, 
2018; Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell & Stangor, 2003). ‘Real’ prejudice is commonly 
constructed as rare and intentional. For example, Burford-Rice and Augoustinos (2017) have 
shown that, following racial slips and gaffes, speakers may argue that their visible slips do 
not align with their true and deeper psychological intentions, and that they should therefore 
be exonerated (see also van Dijk, 1992). ‘Real’ prejudice is often ‘Othered’ to distant people, 
times and places (Andreouli, Greenland & Howarth, 2016). It is also commonly constructed 
as so extreme that it becomes difficult to identify and call out (Andreouli, Greenland & 
Howarth, 2016; Goodman, 2010). It is therefore not just talk about race that is ‘troubling’ 
(c.f. Durrheim, Greener & Whitehead, 2015); racism, and prejudice more generally, are also 
social constructions that are consequential and accountable. As Durrheim (2017, p. 330) 
notes, “accusations and denials of racism rupture ordinary interaction, replacing the easy-
going, friendly and polite routines with bitter acrimony”. 
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These findings indicate that, in addition to the norm against prejudice and complementary to 
it, there is also a norm of not accusing others of prejudice. The two work in conjunction to 
‘Other’ prejudice (Andreouli, Greenland & Howarth, 2016) as something extreme and rare. 
On the one hand, being prejudiced is considered irrational and therefore behaviours and 
utterances that can be construed as prejudiced are treated as accountable. On the other hand, 
accusing others of prejudice can also be considered inappropriate and irrational because it 
shuts down reasonable debate (Goodman, 2010; Goodman & Burke, 2011; Goodman & 
Rowe, 2013). Relatedly, and in the context of Brexit, Durrheim et al. (2018) have shown how 
accusations of racism against Nigel Farage’s (a leading Brexit advocate) hearbly racist 
statements were be treated by his supporters as unjustified attacks. This allowed Farage to 
claim victimisation (and thus, paradoxically, the moral high ground), and mobilise popular 
support against the liberal establishment – a strategy that US President Trump has also 
employed. 
 
It follows that prejudice denial is not solely a matter of self-presentation management in local 
interactions. At a macro level, prejudice denial is anchored in broader ideological traditions, 
and functions to sustain these traditions. The research examples above show that strategies of 
prejudice denial may serve various ideological functions such as: enabling speakers to do 
hearably racist speech acts and to draw a populist distinction between ‘the people’ and the 
liberal ‘elites/ establishment’, while also complying with the liberal taboo against prejudice; 
supporting the ideology of nationalism by helping to distinguish anti-immigration arguments 
from xenophobia and prejudice; reinforcing the neoliberal emphasis on the economy over 
other aspects of immigration (Goodman & Burke, 2011; Lueck, Due & Augoustinos, 2015).  
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The examples outlined above show that there are complex ideological entanglements at play 
in prejudice discourse. An implication of this discursive complexity is that there is a degree 
of open-endedness in social debates about matters related to ‘prejudice’. Billig (1987) uses 
the idea of ‘witcraft’ to highlight the open-endedness and inventiveness of lay thinking. In his 
theorisation of thinking as a form of argumentation, Billig likens everyday argumentation to a 
form of art or skill which enables lay thinkers to employ language flexibly and creatively 
corresponding to the demands of the specific argumentative context at hand. Lay thinkers, 
according to this view, do not just reproduce readymade lines of arguing in their everyday 
debates, but they are able to construct new argumentative lines to support their rhetorical 
projects against counter-arguments. Billig’s work calls for a nuanced analysis of lay thinking 
that does not fall back to general laws, but which calls for being open to the possibility of 
unanticipated discursive findings. In this paper, we follow the same spirit and pay attention to 
how established argumentation patterns manifest in lay talk and also how new argumentative 
lines may emerge through the creative combination of ideas rooted in diverse ideological 
traditions. We use the term ‘ideological creativity’ to describe instances where diverse 
ideological threads are combined together by lay thinkers in everyday talk to produce novel 
positions and argumentative lines. These new lines of arguing are the product of the demands 
of here-and-now debate (where participants strive to make their positions more convincing 
than others in a specific interactional context) and, at the same time, they are embedded in 
specific ideational traditions. By ideological creativity we do not suggest that ideas are free-
floating and ready to be attached to different arguments; ideas are invested with value and are 
attached to histories and identities in a way that can restrict the ideological creativity of lay 
political actors. Nevertheless, as we will show, even in polarised and quite entrenched 
political fields (as in the case of Remainer and Leaver political identities in Brexit Britain; 
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Curtice, 2018), there may be room for ideological cross-fertilisation and dialogical 
engagement across political ‘camps’. 
 
Method 
This paper draws on focus group data conducted prior and after the referendum. Discursive 
psychologists (Potter & Hepburn, 2012) have argued in favor of the use of naturally 
occurring data, instead of data generated through interviews and focus groups based on 
questions that reflect the researcher’s own categories and concerns. Nevertheless, focus 
groups have been proved particularly suitable for to the study of interaction, in general, and 
for the study of the construction of prejudice as an interactive process, in particular (see 
Condor et al., 2006 and Goodman & Burke, 2010, for other examples of focus group research 
on constructions of prejudice).  
 
Nine focus groups (groups 2-10 in Table 1) and one pilot interview were conducted in June 
2016 (prior to the vote) to explore representations of Europe and the EU in the context of the 
upcoming referendum. In the beginning of each focus group, participants were given a word 
association task with the word ‘European’ which was used as stimulus for the discussion. An 
additional three focus groups were conducted in January-February 2017 after the referendum 
had been held and Brexit preparations had begun (groups 11-13 in Table 1). These focus 
groups explored representations of Brexit in light of the referendum result. Participants in 
these focus groups were all men (this was because we were also interested in inter-
generational differences and were concerned that analysis would be complicated by inter-
generational differences in gender performativity). Participants were shown three Remain 
campaign posters and three Leave campaign posters, which served as prompts for the 
discussion (Appendix A).  
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All focus group participants held British citizenship, and none were of European background 
(excluding UK backgrounds). Our sample was politically mixed but leaning more towards 
Remain. Four focus groups consisted of Remain supporters, two of Leave supporters, and six 
of them were mixed1. Participants belonged to different age groups and were residents of 
England and Wales. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Our analysis proceeded in two stages. First, we conducted a thematic analysis to map 
representations of Brexit and the EU across the focus groups. This initial coding revealed that 
prejudice was a recurrent theme. This was not surprising given the content of Brexit-related 
commentary and analysis surrounding the EU referendum. We coded for prejudice when it 
(and other related concepts, such as racism, discrimination, xenophobia, bigotry) was 
specifically topicalised in the talk of participants. For instance, an exchange about whether 
voting for Leave signified intolerance towards migrants would be coded under the theme of 
prejudice (e.g. Extract 2 in the analysis below). We also coded for prejudice when prejudice 
and related terms were not explicitly mentioned but were implicitly oriented to (Durrheim, 
Greener & Whitehead, 2015); this was the case in some anti-immigration and anti-asylum 
related talk in the focus groups.  
 
In the second stage of our analysis, we brought all prejudice-related extracts together and 
conducted a more in-depth analysis, drawing on critical discursive and rhetorical psychology 
                                                                                                                
1 Not all participants stated which way they were going to/had voted; some participants in the 2016 focus groups 
were still undecided and participants in the 2017 focus groups were not directly asked (because both ‘Leaver’ 
and ‘Remainer’ identities had by the time become potentially problematic in different ways). 
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(Billig, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; Wetherell, 1998). We explored the different 
argumentative lines that participants developed to construct and negotiate the relationship 
between prejudice and Brexit. We examined the rhetorical strategies of self-presentation in 
the interaction (particularly in relation to claiming unprejudiced identity credentials), and 
how broader ideological traditions and dilemmas served to anchor these accounts of the 
relationship between Brexit and prejudice. We thus sought to account for both the sequential 
here-and-now dynamics of each focus group discussion, employing insights from 
conversation analytic work, and to engage with the wider ideological and cultural context in 
order to deepen, enrich and contextualise our interpretations. 
 
Analysis  
In what follows, we first discuss argumentative lines that constructed support for Brexit as 
prejudiced; second, we explore argumentative lines which contested the assumed linkage 
between prejudice and Brexit; lastly, we explore the possibilities of what we call ‘ideological 
creativity’ in terms of articulating new political positions and also the difficulty of moving 
beyond polarised discussions of prejudice in the context of Brexit. 
 
Constructing Brexit support as prejudiced  
In many accounts, support for Brexit was constructed as the end product of bigotry and 
prejudice and was therefore treated as in need of explanation. One often repeated explanation 
referred to the emotionality and irrationality of those who voted Leave. The extract below 
comes from a focus group with participants who intended to vote Remain: 
 
Extract  1  
   15  
Rob:  There’s  no  rational  explanation  of  how  they’re  going  to  be  part  of  the  1  
biggest  trading  bloc  in  the  world  and  have  total  control  of  their  borders.  It  isn’t  2  
possible,  and  when  we  leave,  if  they’re  successful,  they  will  absolutely  clamp  3  
down  on  us.  The  Germans  have  said  it,  the  French  have  said  it,  the  European  4  
Union’s  said  it.  5  
Nick:  Oh  yeah,  there’ll  be  trade  wars.  6  
Leslie:  Yes,  we’ll  be  very  unpopular,  won’t  we.  7  
Rob:  They  will  put  us  –  and  Obama’s  said,  we  go  to  the  back  of  the  queue.  It’s  8  
going  to  be  a  nightmare.  9  
Linda:  But  people  aren’t  listening  to  those  messages.  10  
Leslie:  They  don’t  care,  do  they?  11  
Linda:  The  emotion  has  taken  over  their  brains.  [Duncan:  Yeah.]  Bigotry,  not  12  
emotion.  13  
Rob:  Well,  somebody  said  to  me  last  week,  this  is  a  terrible  thing  to  say,  but  14  
somebody  said  to  me  last  week,  “this  is  not  a  referendum  on  Europe,  it’s  an  IQ  15  
test”.  (G2:  Remain,  2016)  16  
   16  
In Extract 1, voting Leave is constructed as irrational and it is related to emotionality 
and bigotry. The irrationality of Brexit support is evidenced on the basis of the dire 
economic consequences of an exit from the European Union (l. 6-9) and reinforced 
with a consensus argument (c.f. Potter & Edwards, 1990) which is further emphasized 
though the construction of a three-part list (Heritage & Greatbatch, 1986): ‘The 
Germans have said it, the French have said it, the European Union’s said it’. The 
argumentative line built through this extract is based on the distinction between reason 
and emotion. This distinction is anchored in the ideology of liberalism which valorises 
reason and condemns emotionality and prejudice as a biased form of thinking (Billig et 
al., 1988). Brexit support in the extract is associated with bigotry (l. 12-13), presumably 
against migrants (given the salience of immigration concerns in pro-Leave accounts; 
see Curtice, 2016), whilst rational decision making would lead people to vote Remain 
because of the risks that Brexit would create (especially l. 3-9). In the last turn (l. 14-
16), the distinction between Remain and Leave is cast by Rob as a distinction between 
intelligence and lack thereof. Rob prefaces this point with a disclaimer (‘this is a 
terrible thing to say, but’) and, by citing someone else, he does not explicitly own the 
opinion that Leave voters have low IQ. This is presumably because this would violate 
the social taboo against making (direct) accusations of bias (as these are often 
dismissed for stifling debate and ‘rupturing’ everyday interactions; Goodman, 2010; 
Durrheim, 2017), or because it might open Rob up to the accusation that he is himself 
prejudiced against Leave voters. By citing someone else’s view, Rob is oriented to 
maintain his neutrality whilst still making the point that the IQ of those who voted 
Leave is questionable. Interestingly, the other accusations against Leave voters (as 
irrational and bigoted) in the extract are not treated as accountable. This may be 
because, given that this is a Remain focus group, these critical opinions are treated as 
   17  
justified and/or it is possible that, by questioning Leave voters’ intelligence, Rob went a 
‘step too far’ with regards to what is ‘sayable’ in this context. 
 
A second, widely repeated explanation of the Leave position referred to nostalgic 
nationalism and prejudice towards foreigners. The extract below comes from a focus 
group with participants who intended to vote Remain: 
 
Extract  2  
Cathy  [interviewer]:  Is  it  all  about  trade,  the  Leave?  1  
Sarah:  No,  that’s  part  of  it.  I  don’t  know  what  you  think  about  this,  I  always  find  2  
them  a  bunch  of  little  Englanders,  who  like  think,  who’ve  got  this  bizarre  rose-­‐3  
tinted  view  of  Britain  that  we  still  have  an  empire,  that  we’re  still  good  old  4  
Blighty  and  that  our  influence  is  amazing  in  the  world.  And  it’s  not.  We’re  only  5  
strong  in  the  world  because  we’re  part  of  the  bigger  EU.  6  
Jessica:  Yes,  actually,  I’ll  agree  with  you  on  that.  7  
Sarah:  We  are  known  for  our  diplomacy  and,  you  know,  I  think  our  embassies  8  
and  our  ambassadors  are  used  a  lot  abroad,  for  our  diplomacy.  But  nothing  else.  9  
I  mean,  I  often  think  about  Farage,  so  we  leave  the  EU,  is  he  expecting  to  take  10  
back  India  by  2020?  11  
Jessica:  Is  that  what  he  said?  12  
Sarah:  No,  but  it’s  what  I  expect  him  to  be  saying.  Because  like,  you  know  13  
something,  we’ve  evolved,  we’ve  moved  on.  14  
Cathy  [interviewer]:  So,  are  they  trying  to  keep  this  sort  of  national  spirit  alive?  15  
You  talk  about  little  Englanders.  You  know,  what  is  it,  what  is  this  little  England  16  
identity?  What  is  it  that  they’re  harping  on  about?  17  
Sarah:  The  ‘50s.  I  don’t  know,  I  wasn’t  born  in  the  ‘50s.  But  this  marvellous  18  
cricket,  warm  beer  and…  Women  had  no  rights,  women  weren’t  allowed  to  19  
divorce.  20  
   18  
Cathy  [interviewer]:  I  don’t  know,  was  it  all  connected  to  the  empire  as  well,  21  
that  there  was  that  sort  of  superiority  still  around?  22  
Sarah:  Yeah,  probably.  I  think  there’s  a  lot  of-­‐  23  
Jessica:  I  think  they  don’t  want  to  be  told  what  to  do  by  somebody  that’s  24  
Sarah:  By  foreigners.  25  
Jessica:  By  foreigners.  I  think  they’re  not  very  good  at  foreigners  [laughs]).  It’d  26  
be  quite  interesting  to  see  on  Thursday  [the  day  of  the  referendum]  where  the  27  
proportion  of  vote  comes  from,  whether  it’s  coming  from  the  cities  and  outside  28  
that,  I’m  going  to  find  absolutely  fascinating  as  to  whether…  Because  I  think,  as  I  29  
said  before,  I  think  that  the  inner  cities,  we’re  extremely  tolerant  of  foreigners.  30  
Whereas  out  in  the  countryside,  I  don’t  think  they  are  quite  so  much.  (G5:  31  
Remain,  2016)  32  
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This extract comes from a focus group where economic concerns were particularly salient. 
Prior to the exchange quoted in Extract 2, participants argued consistently that the UK should 
remain in the EU for economic reasons. Here, the interviewer turns the discussion to the 
arguments for Leave and facilitates a topic shift by tacitly inviting participants to provide 
other reasons for Brexit support (“Is it all about trade”). Interestingly, issues of identity take 
centre stage here while trade becomes secondary (l. 1-2). Responding to the interviewer, 
Sarah constructs Brexit as a backward-looking project that aspires to bring back a long-gone 
British empire, to which Jessica agrees (l. 1-7). In this account, people that support Leave are 
constructed as a “bunch of little Englanders”. Following prompting from the interviewer, 
Sarah explains what she means by Little England identity: it is conservative, outdated and 
intolerant towards women’s rights (l. 18-20). Sarah also cites what could be understood as 
cultural factors (“cricket and warm beer”), which she treats as convergent with conservatism 
and nationalism.  
 
Support for Brexit in the extract is personified in the image of Nigel Farage (l. 10-11), a lead 
Brexit campaigner. Farage is presented in Sarah’s talk as an imperialist who holds an 
unrealistic and outdated view of Britain (“is he expecting to take back India by 2020?”; l. 10-
14). In response to this, Jessica asks if Farage indeed said this, rather than treating it as a 
hyperbolic or ironic. Farage is thus positioned as occupying a marginal ideological position, 
such that he could plausibly have said something like this. Sarah appears to agree with this 
positioning of Farage (“No, but it’s what I expect him to be saying”). This is therefore a 
collaborative construction of a leading Leave advocate as marginal or unreasonable. Building 
on this construction, Leave supporters are constructed as nationalist and imperialist because 
they, like Nigel Farage, feel that they are like the emperors the past. This attitude is presented 
as xenophobic and irrational because it is based on an outdated imperialistic perspective that 
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does not correspond to contemporary Britain (“we’ve evolved, we’ve moved on”). Further, 
while sovereignty was a key argument for the Leave campaign, here it is related to national 
arrogance and superiority (“they don’t want to be told what to do”) towards “foreigners”. The 
prejudice of Brexit supporters therefore has a power dimension (Figgou & Condor, 2006), as 
it seen as rooted in imperial relations of dominance between colonizers and colonies.  
 
In the last turn (l. 26-31), Jessica elaborates further on the relationship between support for 
Leave and intolerance by suggesting that the Leave vote share is likely to be larger in the 
countryside where people are not “quite so much” tolerant of foreigners compared to the 
inner cities where people like herself are “extremely tolerant of foreigners”. Jessica’s 
understatement (“they’re not very good at foreigners”) and the laughter that accompanies it 
allows Jessica to claim her rationality vis-à-vis other people and at the same time to avoid 
openly criticize others of an extreme prejudiced attitude. Prejudice is on the whole ‘Othered’ 
(Andreouli, Greenland & Howarth, 2016) in this extract: it is attributed to other places 
(countryside), times (‘50s) and, most importantly, other people (those that support Leave and 
Farage). This allows the participants to differentiate themselves and establish a liberal and 
tolerant identity position against the ‘irrational prejudice’ of Leave supporters. Ideologically, 
this argumentative line draws on the ideal of a liberal and anti-imperialistic tolerance which 
is presented as suited for the contemporary cosmopolitan world (Andreouli & Howarth, 
2019) contrary to little Englanders’ backwardness.  
 
Contesting constructions of Brexit support as prejudiced  
The previous section showed some examples of the ways in which support for Brexit was 
constructed as an indication of prejudice by our participants. More widely, it can be argued 
that the connection between Brexit support and prejudice has become a symbolic resource 
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that is commonly mobilized in debates about Brexit, even if only to be contested. In this 
context, participants who intended to or had voted Leave, were often put in a position of 
having to account for their vote. The extract below from a mixed focus group provides an 
example of this. 
 
Extract  3  
Harry:  What  frustrated  me  about  Brexit  was  [that]  our  whole  campaign  to  leave  1  
was  based  on  immigration,  as  far  as  I’m  concerned.  Well,  that’s  how  I  saw  it.  I  2  
felt  people  who  voted  to  leave  have  now  been  let  down  because  the  two  who  3  
were  leading  the  campaign,  Gove  and  Boris  [Johnson],  have  upped  sticks  and  4  
gone,  there’s  nothing  left  for  them  in  their  point  of  view.  And  it  was  all  down  5  
basically  to  “oh,  the  NHS  is  going  to  get  so  many  hundreds  of  thousands  a  week”  6  
Oliver:  I  don’t  know.  I  think  it  was  a  large  proportion  of  people  like  me  that  7  
voted  on  an  economic  basis.  […]  8  
Greg:  Why  do  people  not  vote  Remain?  If  it  wasn’t  because  of  that?  Given  that,  9  
you  know,  [they]  were  quite  well  off  in  Wales  because  Europe  made  money.  10  
Oliver:  Yeah.  11  
Greg:  Then  what  was  it  that  made  them  vote  leave?    12  
Oliver:  I  don’t  know.    13  
Greg:  Well  we’ve  got  an  idea  (laughing).  It’s  this  kind  of  stuff  [pointing  to  Leave  14  
posters;  Appendix  A,  Figures  4-­‐6].    15  
Oliver:  Well,  ask  them.  16  
Greg:  Racism.  17  
Oliver:  But,  but  but  but,  for  people  to  be  branded  racists,  as  a  blanket  term  for  18  
everybody  that  votes  Leave.  19  
Connor:  Yep  yeah.  20  
Oliver:  Is  absolute  bollocks.    21  
Connor:  Yeah,  there  is  economics  as  well.  (G12:  Mixed,  2017)  22  
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In the beginning of the extract, Harry voices his disappointment with the Leave campaign 
that, in his view, stoked fears of immigration. Harry’s use of the pronoun ‘our’ to refer to the 
Leave campaign (l. 1) suggests that he was Leave voter, but we cannot confirm this (as Harry 
did not explicitly state which way he voted). In Harry’s account, there is a distinction 
between the Leave campaign and the people that voted Leave: it is the former that is anti-
immigration (l. 1-2), while the latter are presented as being let down by Brexit-supporting 
politicians who have broken their campaign promises (l. 3-6). Oliver, who voted Leave, 
challenges the implication that those who voted Leave have been misinformed. He argues 
that he (like other voters of Leave) voted on the basis of economic considerations (l. 7-8), 
suggesting that this was not a case of misinformation but of sound decision making. This 
argument orients to and discounts the type of argument seen in Extract 1 (i.e., that Leave 
voters are irrational). Oliver’s point, however, does not go uncontested: Greg, who voted 
Remain, voices a challenge to Oliver’s point by questioning why people in Wales, despite 
having benefited from EU funds, voted Leave (l. 9-12), thus effectively reinstating the 
argument of the irrationality of Brexit. Oliver provides a non-preferred (non-answer) 
response (“I don’t know”) (Clayman, 2002) (l. 13), leaving room for Greg to directly accuse 
Leave voters of racism (l. 17). However, making accusations of racism is itself accountable 
because it can be seen as stifling reasonable debate and therefore as so grave that it can only 
be uttered in extreme cases. As soon as Greg explicitly mentions racism, Oliver, with the 
support of Connor, challenges the overgeneralization of people that voted Leave as racists (l. 
18-21). It is the accusation of racism that is presented here as irrational (because it relies on 
categorical thinking and over-generalization, rather than rational analysis; see Figgou & 
Condor, 2006). The establishment of Brexit support as a non-racist political position allows 
Connor to reinstate the point about the role of economics in Leave voting (l. 22), despite 
Greg just having challenged this very argument in response to Oliver. These references to 
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economics can be understood as instances of discursive deracialisation (Augoustinos & 
Every, 2007), that is, attributing actions that can be construed as racist (such as voting Leave) 
to elements that are not race-implicative (i.e. economics). They can also be seen as indicative 
of a neoliberal rationality which valorizes the economy (Brown, 2015) as the sphere of 
neutral, rational decision making, contrary to the emotionality of politics (Andreouli & 
Nicholson, 2018).  
 
Participants who intended to/had voted Leave deployed additional arguments to 
dissociate concerns about immigration (which were very salient in the Leave campaign) 
from prejudice. The extract below comes from a mixed focus group: 
  
Extract  4  
Mandy:  I'm  not  against  immigration  actually.  I  know  a  lot  of  Leave  people  are.  I  1  
just  think  it  needs  to  be  controlled.  I  think  that  migrants  have  become  the  blame  2  
for  it  all  and  I  actually  feel  sorry  for  them,  because  they're  only  trying  to  give  3  
themselves  a  better  life.  It's  because-­‐  4  
Jim:  Some  of  them.  5  
Mandy:  Some  of  them,  but  I  actually  think  that  if  -­‐  I'm  probably  going  to  say  6  
something  really  -­‐  I  think  our  Government  is  to  blame,  because  if  they  hadn't  7  
made  it  so  easy  to  come  in  and  to  be  able  to  take  advantage  of  our  system,  8  
which  any  human  being,  if  they  come  from  a  poor  country  and  they  see  that  9  
people  are  living  what  they  deem  as  a  wonderful  life  in  this  country  -­‐  they  don’t  10  
all  come  over  and  live  a  wonderful  life,  some  of  them  live  in  appalling  conditions,  11  
but  it's  still  better  than  what  they  come  from  -­‐  then  they're  going  to  do  it.  That's  12  
human  nature.  (G10:  Mixed,  2017)  13  
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The extract above starts with Mandy, who voted Leave, saying that she is not against 
immigration compared to other voters of Leave (l. 1). Employing a disclaimer similar to the 
well-researched “I’m not racist but” (van Dijk, 1992), she voices an argument in favour of 
controlling immigration (l. 1-2) (presumably in contrast to stopping immigration altogether, 
which is potentially hearable as an anti-immigration view and could open Mandy up to 
accusations of prejudice). Mandy’s accountability concerns are indicative of the widespread 
assumption that Leave support is an anti-immigration position. Mandy indeed concedes that 
“a lot of Leave people” are anti-immigration and, by implication, prejudiced. At the same 
time, she works to discount possible counter-arguments (Billig, 1987) and to position herself 
as both a Leave voter and not prejudiced. Mandy achieves this by making a distinction 
between being in favour of controlling immigration and being against migrants. She argues 
that high levels of immigration are the government’s fault for not having enforced sufficient 
controls (l. 7-8), expresses regret for migrants who bear the brunt of people’s frustration over 
immigration levels (l. 2-4), and positions them into the shared superordinary category of 
being human with a ‘natural’ desire to seek a better life in the UK (l. 9-13). By humanizing 
migrants whilst blaming ‘soft’ immigration policy, Mandy positions herself simultaneously 
as anti-immigration and pro-migrants. Mandy draws on a discourse of humanitarianism 
which allows her to present herself as liberal towards those in need and also as rational, 
moderate and pragmatic (Every, 2008), because she supports ‘controlling’, not stopping, 
immigration.  
 
As we saw in Extract 3, accusations of prejudice directed to those who voted Leave could be 
constructed as an unjustified and irrational overgeneralization (Figgou & Condor, 2006). This 
line of argument reverses the association of Remain/tolerance and Leave/prejudice (towards 
migrants), so that it is supporters of Remain that are presented as prejudiced (towards Leave 
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voters). In the extract below from a mixed focus group, we identify a similar line of argument 
that works to challenge the reasonableness of Remain supporters and to differentiate voting 
Leave from extreme prejudice. 
  
Extract  5  
Emily  [interviewer]:  Well  I’ve  got  some  more,  different  posters  [showing  Remain  1  
posters;  Figures  1-­‐3  in  Appendix  A]  if  you  want  something  else  to  have  a  look  at.  2  
What  do  you  have  to  say  in  response  to  these  ones?  3  
James:  I  mean.  This  looks  like  Adolf  Hitler’s  face!    4  
Paul:  Yes,  yes.  5  
James:  Well  that  is  disgusting.  I  would  not,  I’d  tear  that  up.    6  
Emily:  Why?  7  
James:  Because  if  you  think  of  a  man  like  Hitler,  who  was  the  [most]  terrible  man  8  
who  ever  lived  on  this  earth  apart  from  Napoleon,  Genghis  Khan  and  all  the  rest  9  
of  it.  But,  you  can’t  compare  that  with  what  we’re  trying  to  do.  I  mean  Hitler  was  10  
an  awful  man,  and  I  was  a  war  baby.  11  
Andrew:  It’s  the  same  sort  of  thing  as  the  last  ones,  it’s  the  exception.  You  know,  12  
I  mean,  I  don’t  like  Murdoch,  Farage,  Galloway,  don’t  know  who  Nick  Griffin  is,  13  
Marine  Le  Pen,  I  don’t  like  any  of  them.  And  I  wouldn’t  want  to  associate  with  14  
them.  But  more  than  50%  of  the  population  voted  to  leave.  And  it’s  not  because  15  
of  what  Nigel  Farage  said.  (G13:  Mixed,  2017)  16  
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In this extract, the interviewer introduces material from the Remain campaign (see Appendix 
A). Participants initially discuss a Remain campaign poster, showing Nigel Farage's face, 
with the shadow of the microphone giving him the appearance of a 'Hitler-esque' moustache 
(Figure 1 in Appendix A). Throughout the extract, James and Andrew, who both voted 
Leave, position themselves as offended at the suggestion that the politics of Hitler have 
parallels with support for Leave. James strongly argues against drawing such links and 
appears upset (l. 6, 8-11). Similar to Extract 3, James questions the reasonableness of 
accusing supporters of Leave of extreme prejudice because there is no legitimate basis for 
this comparison to Hitler (l. 10-11). He draws on both an anti-imperialistic ideological frame 
(which condemns historical figures like Napoleon and Genghis Khan) and on a liberal 
tolerance frame which condemns prejudice. In the next turn, Andrew does not question that 
these extreme political views can be found among advocates of Leave, but he argues that they 
would be the exception (l. 12) – this echoes Extract 4, in which Mandy concedes the 
existence of prejudice among Leave voters while distancing herself from such prejudice. 
Referring to another Remain poster (Figure 2 in Appendix A), Andrew differentiates between 
Leave voters, on the one hand, and Brexit-supporting politicians and other stakeholders, on 
the other (l. 13-16). The former are presented as ordinary and many (“over 50% of the 
population”), while the latter are singled out as extreme particular cases (c.f. Billig, 1987). By 
distinguishing between these high-profile Brexiters, who are presented here as discrediting 
the Leave vote, and ordinary people who voted Leave, Andrew’s argument can be read as an 
attempt to normalize the Leave vote as the voice of the majority, and, by implication, as 
common-sense and reasonable. 
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The practice of EU governance (and the Remain project as a whole) was itself 
constructed as racist in some focus groups. The extract below comes from a mixed 
focus group: 
  
Extract  6  
Emily  [interviewer]:  So,  if  you  wanted  to  leave,  would  that  not  give  you  a  bad  1  
self-­‐image?  Would  you  not  get  judged  for  wanting  to  leave?  2  
Aaron:  Well,  you  don’t  have  to  justify  your  vote  to  anyone.  No  one  sees  you  3  
vote.  4  
Peter:  Leaving  the  EU  kind  of  helps  people  that  are  refugees  and-­‐  or  like  non-­‐EU  5  
citizens  more  in  terms  of  migration,  I  suppose?  Because  it  means  that  people  6  
who  are  from  Europe  aren’t  in  front  of  the  queue.  It  will  be  equal  for  everyone  7  
now,  that’s  why  it’s  less  racist.  (G11:  Mixed,  2017)  8  
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Preceding the extract above was a discussion of the ways that the Leave campaign 
manipulated people’s fears over immigration. In this context, the interviewer asks directly 
about the implications of this for the self-image of Leave voters, thus bringing the issue of 
self-presentation into the discussion (l. 1-2). Aaron refers to the principle that citizens have 
the right to vote and are not obliged to justify their vote. This formulation allows for the 
possibility of being embarrassed about how he has voted while avoiding being held 
accountable by virtue of being able to keep it a secret (indeed, by nodding to the democratic 
principle of free voting through secret ballot, Aaron establishes strong grounds on which to 
justify not revealing one’s vote). Peter, a Leave voter who seems to have construed the 
interviewer’s question as associating Brexit support with anti-immigration prejudice, does not 
accept the question’s premise. His account is based on a critique of Eurocentrism: while 
remaining in the EU would maintain a hierarchy between EU citizens and non-EU citizens in 
terms of their rights of movement, leaving would create a level playing field for all migrants 
(l. 5-7). This makes Brexit “equal for everyone” and “less racist” (l. 7-8). In this extract, as in 
Extract 2, we see again the assumption that prejudice involves a power dimension whereby 
some categories of people are treated unequally relative to others. In Peter’s account, because 
Brexit would equalize the discrepancy between EU and non-EU migrants, it follows that 
support for Leave cannot, by definition, be based on racism. Peter employs the discursive 
strategy of ‘reversal’ (van Dijk, 1992) whereby accusations of racism levelled against Leave 
voters are reversed. He suggests that Leavers are anti-racist and Remain voters are (more) 
racist. 
 
The notion of prejudice is ‘stretched’ (c.f. Andreouli, Kaposi & Stenner, 2019) in Extract 6 to 
mean the exact opposite of what it commonly refers to, particularly in Remain-supporting 
accounts: from being associated with Eurosceptic and anti-immigration attitudes, prejudice is 
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here associated with Eurocentrism. This line of reasoning has been common among some 
Brexit supporters and can be seen in a broader narrative of ‘cosmopolitan Brexit’ and ‘global 
Britain’ (Andreouli, 2019) which gained prominence following the referendum. As has also 
been shown in analyses of skills-based arguments on immigration (that migrants should be 
assessed on the basis of their skills, not their nationality), the notion of meritocracy works to 
discursively individualize migration and deracialize the exclusion of migrants (Gibson & 
Booth, 2018). Drawing on this discourse of meritocratic equality, speakers argue for stricter 
immigration controls whilst presenting themselves as reasonable and tolerant. This is similar 
to Mandy’s account in Extract 4, where a ‘controlled’ approach to immigration is presented 
as moderate and reasonable. 
 
Beyond prejudice in Brexit debates? 
Our analysis shows that the connection between support for Leave and prejudice, 
particularly around discussions of immigration and border controls, was a widely 
shared frame of reference, but also one that was highly contested. This framing of the 
debate posed a dilemma for left-wing participants who were critical of the EU but not 
on the basis of immigration and border control concerns. The extract below comes from 
a focus group with a group of left-leaning young participants in London, all of whom 
intended to vote Remain and positioned themselves categorically in favour of 
immigration (see also Andreouli, Kaposi & Stenner, 2019): 
  
Extract  7  
Amanda:  I'm  quite  surprised,  because  I  feel  like  everyone's  focusing  on  the  far-­‐1  
right,  UKIP,  kind  of  exiters,  but  there's  definitely,  there's  got  to  be  a  side  that's  2  
coming  from  the  left,  you  know?  […]  and  it's  like  Jeremy  Corbyn,  until  recently,  3  
he  was  -­‐  I  don't  know  if  he  was  undecided,  he  just  wasn't  committing  himself,  4  
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because  there  is  the  idea  that  you'd  like  to  -­‐  not  decentralise,  but  to  be  more  5  
local  […]  So  I  get  that,  but  it  seems  to  me  like  people  who  are  on  the  left  who  6  
want  to  leave,  like  almost  can't  speak  out,  like  they've  lost  a  voice,  because  they  7  
just  are  scared  of  looking  like  they're  far-­‐right  and  xenophobic.  […]  8  
Antony:  I  think  there's  a  lot  of  anger  about  how  Greece  got  treated,  as  well,  the  9  
banking  crisis,  and  how  Germany  is  very  dominant  in  Europe.  There's  a  lot  of  10  
people  have  deep  issues  with  that,  I  think.    11  
Cathy  [interviewer]:  So,  do  you  think  there's  slight  anti-­‐Germany  stuff,  might  be  12  
resurfacing  just  a  tad?    13  
Antony:   Yes,  and  I  think  that  feeling  of  getting  one  against  big  business  and  big  14  
banking  and  the  financial  sector.  But  it  makes  me  feel  a  little  uneasy  about  the  15  
whole  thing,  because  you  are  essentially  voting  for  status  quo,  and  it  does  feel  16  
like  most  big  business,  and  certainly  the  banking  sector,  want  to  stay  in.  (G3:  17  
Remain,  2016)  18  
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In this focus group, there was a strong pro-Remain consensus. In this specific stretch of talk, 
however, participants engaged in a critical discussion of the European Union. Three critiques 
of the EU are expressed in this extract: that the EU does not allow for political 
decentralisation (l. 5-6), that power is unequally distributed within the block with harmful 
consequences such as the mishandling of the Greek sovereign debt crisis (l. 9-11), and that 
the EU supports the financial establishment (l. 14-17). All these are presented as left 
arguments and are associated with Jeremy Corbyn, the leftist leader of the UK Labour Party 
(l. 3; l. 6-7). This critique of the EU can be understood in terms of ‘Lexit’ (‘Left Exit’), that 
is, support of Brexit from a left political perspective on the basis of an anti-capitalist and anti-
globalisation ideological position. For Amanda, given these critiques of the EU, it is 
surprising that there is not more discussion about a left Brexit, suggesting the left would 
normally be expected to support Leave. Antony appears to agree with Amanda. He argues 
that, while a vote for Remain is a vote for the status quo that privileges big business and the 
banking sector (l. 14-17), support for Leave challenges the status quo, which works for the 
powerful (like Germany) but mistreats the powerless (e.g. Greece). There is an assumption 
here, as in Extract 5, that actions that are oriented towards the protection of the powerless 
cannot be markers of prejudice (Figgou & Condor, 2006; Inman, Huerta & Oh, 1998; 
O’Brien, Kinias & Major, 2008). Hence, supporting Leave to challenge the power 
asymmetries of the status quo (and not to exclude migrants) can be constructed as a 
progressive political position that is aligned with the left (a similar argument was made in 
Extract 6, where it was the concern over the imbalance between EU/non-EU citizens that 
made support for Brexit non-racist).  
 
 
   32  
However, and while support for Remain may feel “uneasy” (l.15), supporting Leave is more 
troubling (c.f. Wetherell, 1998). From the perspective of these leftist participants, Brexiter is 
a tainted political identity that is associated with far-right and xenophobic views (l. 8), and 
which makes a Lexit perspective untenable and silenced. As Amanda puts it, “people who are 
on the left who want to leave” feel that they “can't speak out, like they've lost a voice” (l. 6-
7). Overall, given the widely assumed link between support for Brexit and prejudice, 
particularly among supporters of Remain, participants found it difficult to support a ‘Lexit’ 
perspective as it would jeopardise their leftist identity credentials (see also Andreouli, Kaposi 
& Stenner, 2019).  
 
Discussion 
In this paper, our aim has been to examine how the links between Brexit support and 
prejudice are constructed and contested in lay discourse, their ideological foundations, and 
the political implications of these constructions. Our study challenges analyses of Brexit that 
seek to develop single causality frameworks (Clarke & Newman, 2019) about what led to 
Brexit and, in effect, about what makes citizens Remainers or Brexiters, Eurosceptics or 
Europhiles, nationalists or cosmopolitans and so on. Our work also challenges traditional 
psychological research which seeks to establish correlations between relatively stable 
psychological characteristics and political positions, such as pro/anti-EU or pro/anti-
immigration. Instead, we draw attention to the way that lay political reasoning about Brexit is 
situated and contingent on interactional dynamics (e.g., self-presentation concerns in the 
presence of those who voice opposing and/or similar perspectives). Relatedly, we showed 
that prejudice is collaboratively constructed in interaction (Condor et al., 2006; Durrheim, 
Greener & Whitehead, 2015) and also that these constructions of prejudice occupy a central 
role in structuring, justifying, or delegitimizing positions toward Brexit. 
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In our focus groups, Brexit-supporting views were routinely treated as equivalent to anti-
immigration views and, as such, they were often tainted as prejudiced, particularly among 
participants who supported Remain. From the perspectives of participants who supported 
Leave, this raised accountability concerns and led to attempts to present Brexit as aligned 
with norms of reason and tolerance. Towards this end, several rhetorical strategies were used 
in Brexit-supporting talk in our focus groups. First, presenting Brexit as economically 
beneficial (Extract 3) was one such strategy that enabled speakers to dissociate Brexit from 
immigration whilst at the same time constructing it as economically sound for the UK, thus 
countering the idea that Brexit support is based on irrational prejudice. A second strategy for 
disassociating Leave support from hostility towards migrants was making a ‘two kinds’ 
argument (Greenland, Andreouli, Augoustinos & Taulke-Johnson, 2018). This was achieved 
by distinguishing between concerns over ‘soft-touch’ immigration management, which were 
constructed as reasonable, and prejudice towards migrants as people, which was seen as not 
acceptable (Extract 4). A third strategy was to ‘Other’ Brexit prejudice (c.f. Andreouli, 
Greenland & Howarth, 2016) to extreme cases such as the far-right, whilst maintaining the 
ordinariness of the average Brexit supporter (Extract 5). There was, more generally, a 
recurrent practice of constructing the ‘reasonable/rational Leave voter’ against the 
widespread view that Leavers are irrational and prejudiced (Extracts 4 and 5). Another 
strategy for claiming positive Leaver identities was linking Brexit support with values that 
are understood as progressive, such as humanitarian compassion (Extract 4), equality and 
anti-racism (Extract 6).  
 
The different constructions of the relationship between Brexit support and prejudice are not 
only consequential at the local interactional level. Importantly, they are also politically 
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consequential: they advance different political projects (for/against Brexit and for/against 
different kinds of Brexit), and they work to silence some perspectives (those which are 
constructed as irrational and bigoted) whilst giving voice to others (those constructed as 
reasonable and liberal) (see also, Durrheim et al., 2018; Durrheim, Quayle, & Dixon, 2016). 
More specifically, Remain-supporting accounts constructed Brexit as a prejudiced political 
position, and therefore attempted to delegitimise Brexit by casting it as irrational and bigoted. 
On the other hand, the idea that Brexit support is associated with prejudice was contested in 
accounts that put forward different visions of Brexit (e.g. Brexit as a cosmopolitan project). 
This was the case some in Leave-supporting accounts. But the notion that support for Brexit 
is the outcome of prejudice was also challenged in some Remain accounts: in Extract 7, the 
relationship between Brexit support and prejudice was challenged on the basis that Brexit can 
potentially challenge intra-EU power asymmetries.  
 
This analysis illustrates the complexity of lay political accounts around Brexit that resist neat 
dichotomies such as tolerant Remain/prejudiced Leave, left/right, pro/anti-immigration and 
so on. The nuance of lay accounts is evident in the ideological complexity of participants’ 
accounts. Talk about the EU referendum and Brexit in the focus groups was anchored in 
diverse but entangled ideological foundations such as: the liberal distinction between reason 
and bias (Extracts 1 and 5), the neoliberal valorization of economic issues over other political 
matters (Extract 3), post-imperial tolerance (Extract 2) and anti-imperial expansionism 
(Extract 5), humanitarianism (Extract 4), colour-blind equality (Extract 6), and anti-
capitalism (Extract 7). This ideological complexity allowed for variability in participants’ 
accounts and for movement between different positions (supporting Billig’s, 1987, idea of 
people as argumentative thinkers). Participants drew on diverse ideological themes to 
construct complex accounts towards Brexit. We describe this as ‘ideological creativity’; that 
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is, the entanglement of various, sometimes seemingly opposing, ideological themes to 
construct nuanced and novel political arguments that correspond to the demands of specific 
rhetorical projects in lay political debate. Participants may for example combine ideas that 
are commonly seen as left (e.g. anti-racism and meritocracy) and ideas seen as right-wing 
(e.g. Euroscepticism and immigration control) to produce complex accounts about the merits 
and dangers of Brexit. This was evident, for instance, in Extracts 6 and 7 where the norm 
against prejudice was used to argue in opposing directions: in the first case Brexit was 
presented as a cosmopolitan and meritocratic project, thus conforming to the norm against 
prejudice, while in the latter extract (albeit with caveats) it was presented as a nationalistic 
project that violates this norm. New ideological constellations can thus start to emerge from 
the ideological creativity that develops in the exchanges of lay political debate. For example, 
we saw an argument of ‘cosmopolitan anti-Europeanism’ in Extract 6 and an account in 
favour of a ‘pro-diversity anti-globalization’ in Extract 7. We suggest that scholars 
researching discursive constructions of prejudice pay more attention to this ideological 
complexity and, more importantly, to the creativity that lay actors may exhibit in their 
interactions. Our research shows that there is no single or predetermined argumentative route 
for achieving rhetorical ends; for example, prejudice denial may work to argue in very 
different directions and to support very different political projects. 
 
On the other hand, our analysis also shows that ideological creativity can be restricted and 
resisted by established patterns of thinking which may be too invested or too entrenched to be 
open to change. This was the case in our research where the ideological exchange between 
the Remain and Leave ‘camps’ was hindered by the polarity of Brexit politics. This was 
particularly shown in Extract 7 which shows that supporting Brexit from a leftist perspective 
can be a ‘troubling’ (c.f. Wetherell, 1998) identity position (see also Andreouli, Kaposi & 
   36  
Stenner, 2019). This is because support for Brexit has been predominantly constructed as a 
political position that is prejudiced, illiberal and broadly incommensurable with the left, 
while, conversely, pro-EU positions are treated as open-minded, tolerant and liberal. In this 
discursive frame, the critique of the EU and of current political arrangements is seen as only 
feasible within an anti-immigration and national protectionist narrative, making it very 
difficult to criticise the status quo of economic globalisation without also taking a stab at 
cosmopolitan values (see Gilbert, 2017). Although not directly demonstrated in Extract 6, we 
can speculate that the position of ‘cosmopolitan anti-Europeanism’ is equally difficult to 
sustain given the very strong association of Brexit with nationalism in popular discourse. We 
see here that constructions of prejudice provide the ideological scaffold for the polarisation 
between Remain and Leave by hardening the identity stakes of the political actors involved in 
this debate. Three years on (at the time of writing, in 2019), this polarity remains entrenched 
(Curtice, 2018; Hobolt & Tiley, 2019). We therefore suggest that despite the variety and 
complexity of lay accounts as exemplified in our data, the dominant political narratives seem 
to have been unable to provide a space for more nuanced perspectives, thus polarising the 
debate into a pro/anti EU schema and leaving little room for the creation of new ideas.  
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Table 1. Research participants 
Focus 
group 
No of 
participants  
Gender Age Location  Voting 
intention (G2-
G10)/ Vote 
(G11-G13) 
Pilot 
interview 
1 1M 20 London Leave 
G2 4   2F, 2M 50-60 Cumbria Remain 
G3 4 2F, 2M 30-40 London  Remain 
G4 6 3F, 3M 30-45 Kent Mixed 
G5 2  2F 40-60 London Remain 
G6 4 3M 40-50 Hertfordshire Leave 
G7 3   2F,1M 30-40 Hertfordshire Leave 
G8 3  3F 30-40 London Remain 
G9 6 6M 30-55 London Mixed 
G10 6 4F, 2M 40-70 Hampshire Mixed 
G11 4 4M 20-22 South Wales Mixed 
G12 4 4M 45-52 South Wales Mixed 
G13 4 4M 70-77 South England Mixed 
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Appendix A: EU referendum campaign posters (2016) used in focus groups 11- 13 
 
Figure 1. ‘Remain’ poster 1 
 
 
Figure 2. ‘Remain’ poster 2 
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Figure 3. ‘Remain’ poster 3 
 
 
Figure 4. ‘Leave’ poster 1 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 'Leave’ poster 2 
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Figure 6. ‘Leave’ poster 3 
 
 
 
 
 
